Why Russia Wants a Stronger Relationship With North Korea

At first glance, the relationship seems strange.

Russia is one of the world's largest countries.

North Korea is isolated, heavily sanctioned and economically much smaller.

So why would Moscow need Pyongyang?

Because wars create unusual markets.

And North Korea possesses something Russia increasingly values:

industrial capacity dedicated to weapons production, large stocks of ammunition and a government willing to take political risks that many other states will not.

The relationship changed after 2022

Russia and North Korea had maintained relations for decades.

But the invasion of Ukraine dramatically increased their strategic value to one another.

North Korea could provide ammunition and missiles.

Russia could provide economic, political and potentially military benefits in return.

The relationship deepened rapidly.

In June 2024, Putin visited Pyongyang and signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty with Kim Jong Un.

The treaty includes provisions for military assistance if either country is subjected to armed attack. It entered into force later that year.

That is considerably more serious than ordinary diplomatic cooperation.

What Russia gets

The obvious benefit is ammunition.

War consumes ammunition at extraordinary speed.

Artillery shells.

Rockets.

Missiles.

Other military supplies.

North Korea possesses large-scale weapons manufacturing capacity built around exactly this kind of production.

North Korea has also supplied ballistic missiles, according to assessments from governments and researchers. Japan's 2026 defense assessment says North Korea supplied Russia with weapons and ammunition and dispatched thousands of soldiers.

Then came something even more significant:

North Korean troops.

More than 10,000 North Korean soldiers were sent to Russia, with their involvement in fighting in the Kursk region later acknowledged by both governments.

That changes the relationship.

This is no longer simply:

weapons for money.

It becomes:

military cooperation, battlefield experience and strategic exchange.

What North Korea gets

This side may ultimately be more consequential.

North Korea wants technology.

It wants economic support.

It wants diplomatic protection.

And it wants military capabilities that can improve the survivability and effectiveness of its armed forces.

The danger for Western and Asian governments is that Russia could provide expertise or technology that helps North Korea improve missile, satellite, drone or other military capabilities.

Japan's 2026 defense assessment explicitly warns about the possibility of Russian nuclear- and missile-related technology transferring to North Korea.

That would create a feedback loop.

North Korea helps Russia sustain its war.

Russia helps North Korea improve its military.

Both become more capable.

The battlefield became a classroom

There is another fascinating dimension.

North Korean soldiers who fought alongside Russian forces were exposed to modern battlefield conditions.

Drones.

Electronic warfare.

Artillery coordination.

Surveillance.

Mass drone attacks.

This matters because North Korea has spent decades preparing for a potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

Real battlefield experience is something military planners cannot easily manufacture in a training exercise.

Japan's defense ministry has warned that lessons learned by North Korean forces in Ukraine could eventually spread through the wider North Korean military.

This isn't only about Ukraine

The biggest mistake would be treating Russia-North Korea cooperation as something that disappears when the Ukraine war ends.

The relationship now has its own momentum.

The two countries have established a formal strategic partnership.

North Korea has become increasingly integrated into Russia's wartime supply system.

And Russia has incentives to maintain access to North Korean military production.

Recent analysis describes the relationship as moving beyond a transactional arms arrangement toward a more institutionalized partnership.

That's why the relationship matters to Japan, South Korea, China and the United States.

The consequences extend far beyond Europe.