Why Russia and North Korea Are Getting Closer

When Vladimir Putin arrived in Pyongyang in June 2024, he and Kim Jong Un signed a treaty that promised more than friendly declarations. It bound their governments to military and other assistance if either were subjected to armed invasion, and it set out cooperation across trade, technology, energy, science and security. The treaty entered into force that December. [1] [2]

The pact did not create the rapprochement. It gave legal and political form to one already taking shape around Russia’s war against Ukraine. North Korea could offer what Moscow urgently needed: artillery ammunition, missiles and, later, troops. Russia could offer a sanctioned state something it struggles to obtain elsewhere: money and material, military experience, a powerful diplomatic partner, and perhaps access to technologies with military applications. The precise terms of the exchange remain opaque. [3] [4]

War made the relationship useful

The timing matters. Moscow and Pyongyang had a long history, but their relationship had cooled after the Soviet Union collapsed. Russia had joined China in supporting United Nations sanctions on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. The break with that approach came gradually, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine isolated it from Western markets and technology and created a sustained demand for weapons. [5]

U.S. intelligence assessed in 2024 that North Korea had probably begun shipping munitions to Russia in exchange for diplomatic, economic and military concessions. Subsequent monitoring has documented the scale of the military link. The Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, or MSMT, reported that a participating state assessed that North Korea sent more than 20,000 containers of munitions and related materiel to Russia from September 2023. The report cites a separate open-source estimate of 4.2 million to 5.8 million artillery shells and rockets shipped by sea between August 2023 and March 2025. These are estimates built from different evidence and methods, not a publicly audited tally. [3] [5]

North Korea’s contribution grew beyond cargo. In April 2025, Pyongyang publicly acknowledged for the first time that it had sent troops to fight alongside Russian forces in the Kursk region. The MSMT report, drawing on a participating state’s information, says more than 11,000 North Korean troops were deployed in late 2024; Reuters reported that North Korea and Russia had both confirmed the deployment by April 2025. [3] [4]

Later totals are less certain. Chatham House reported in September 2026 that South Korea’s Defence Intelligence Agency estimated more than 16,000 North Korean personnel had been sent to Russia since October 2024, and that the North had supplied more than 15 million artillery rounds. Those figures reflect an attributed intelligence estimate; troop rotations, changing definitions and limits on independent access make a single definitive count difficult. [9]

What Pyongyang may be buying

For Kim, the exchange offers immediate material value. The MSMT report says Russia supplied refined petroleum above the UN-mandated cap and maintained correspondent banking relations with North Korea. It also reports Russian transfers of air-defence equipment and anti-aircraft missiles, and says Russia trained North Korean troops. The team identifies these as prohibited activities under Security Council resolutions. Its report is based primarily on information supplied by participating governments, international organizations and civil society, and covers January 2024 through April 2025. [3]

The battlefield itself may be a form of military education. North Korean soldiers have encountered drone warfare, electronic warfare, artillery coordination and modern logistics in a live conflict. Chatham House argues that this experience could improve North Korea’s capacity to fight in the future. But the degree of learning, and whether Russia has transferred sensitive systems or components beyond what has been publicly documented, remains difficult to establish. [9]

There is also a diplomatic return. A permanent Security Council member willing to cooperate with Pyongyang—and to contest sanctions enforcement—reduces North Korea’s isolation. The treaty frames the partnership as opposition to what both governments describe as Western “hegemony.” That is their political language, not a neutral account of the treaty’s effect. The United States’ 2024 intelligence assessment judged that Kim hopes closer Russian ties will bring financial gains, diplomatic support and defense cooperation, and could help his goal of wider acceptance as a nuclear power. [2] [5]

What Moscow gets in return

Russia gets supplies that can help sustain a war of attrition. The MSMT says North Korea transferred ballistic missiles and ammunition and sent troops to support Russia’s war effort. North Korea itself publicly cast its deployment as a decision made under the partnership treaty; Putin publicly thanked Kim after the deployment was acknowledged. [3] [4]

That support comes with strategic value beyond the front. It signals that Moscow can find partners willing to defy the sanctions regime and allows Russia to present itself as an actor with ties in Northeast Asia. There may also be a labor dimension: the Congressional Research Service notes reports of North Korean workers in Russia, with some possibly employed in violation of UN sanctions. Claims about the amount of compensation and the balance between cash, fuel, food or other goods remain difficult to verify. [1]

The relationship also helps Moscow answer its own isolation. The U.S. intelligence community described Russia’s growing ties with North Korea, China and Iran as part of its effort to strengthen defense production and its economy, and to mitigate the costs of sanctions. That is an assessment of Russia’s broader strategy; it does not prove that each deal with Pyongyang was arranged for one single purpose. [5]

A treaty, and a weakening sanctions system

The 2024 treaty matters because it raises the political stakes of future cooperation. Its mutual-assistance clause applies if one party is put in a state of war by armed invasion; it is not a blank cheque for every military action. The agreement also provides for broader defense coordination, economic exchanges, cooperation in science and technology, and opposition to unilateral sanctions. [2]

Meanwhile, enforcement has become more contested. In March 2024, Russia vetoed renewal of the UN Panel of Experts that monitored sanctions on North Korea. The UN reported that the vote was 13 in favour, Russia against and China abstaining. The veto ended the panel’s mandate, but it did **not** repeal the sanctions themselves. [6]

Eleven governments later established the MSMT to investigate and publish information about violations and evasion. That matters, but it is not the same as a UN-appointed monitoring panel: its reports are produced by participating states and do not carry the Security Council’s authority. The MSMT’s inaugural report documents allegations and evidence of prohibited transfers, fuel supplies and training; readers should distinguish its attribution to participating states from an independently adjudicated finding. [3] [7]

What this means

This partnership connects the European war to security calculations in East Asia. North Korean weapons and personnel help Russia’s campaign; in return, access to Russian equipment, expertise or operational feedback could strengthen North Korea’s forces. U.S. government and research assessments warn that improvements in Pyongyang’s missile, space or other military capabilities could matter to South Korea, Japan and the United States. The risk is real, but the public record does not show that Russia has handed North Korea every advanced capability analysts worry about. [1] [5] [8] It also complicates the regional balance without making North Korea a Russian proxy. Pyongyang has its own priorities, and the treaty’s language gives Kim a way to pursue them while presenting the relationship as one between equals. China remains North Korea’s principal economic partner, according to the Congressional Research Service, and the new ties with Russia do not erase that dependence. They may, however, give Pyongyang another source of leverage and give Moscow a larger role in a region where it wants influence. [1] [9] For governments trying to deter North Korea, the challenge is no longer only how to constrain Pyongyang’s access to money and materials. It is how to discourage a feedback loop in which military support for Russia helps North Korea acquire resources and experience, while the erosion of international monitoring makes the exchange harder to track. That problem persists even if the two leaders’ interests eventually diverge. [3] [7]

The question nobody asks

How much of this partnership can each side afford to sustain? The spotlight usually falls on the weapons moving from North Korea to Russia and the Russian technology that may move back. Less visible are the costs: depleted stocks, casualties, sanctions exposure and the resources needed to maintain the relationship. Chatham House notes that North Korea cannot draw down ammunition and manpower indefinitely without affecting its own readiness. Russia, meanwhile, must decide what it is willing to give a partner whose capabilities could alter security on its far eastern flank. [9] The answer will not be found in treaty language alone. Governments disclose only fragments of the exchange, and estimates of shipments, troop totals and compensation vary. What can be said with confidence is narrower but consequential: military cooperation has become public and institutionalized; both governments have acknowledged the troop deployment; and monitors have documented extensive arms transfers and other sanctions violations. The ultimate scale of Russian assistance—and how much Pyongyang has gained from combat experience—remains uncertain. [3] [4]